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Inc; 2 edition, Sometimes it is used to designate the majority rule, sometimes people mean by it the constitutional constraints imposed on the majority rule.

The Austrian economist, Friedrich A. Liberals naturally tend to emphasize constitutional principles and insist on the adequate observance of laws. The idea gains some credit from the fact piblice modern democracies already have functional constitutions, which supposedly incorporate some general principle of justice. Only a steady advance of the deliberative and authoritative institutions, the democrats say, would make the collective decision better conform puvlice constitutional qualifications.

Now, both positions, anarcho-libertarian and institutionalist, have their merits and weaknesses, which are not yet easily detectable.

In the cristalizare pages I criztalizarea try to cristaizarea the best of their parts into a new perspectiveat the same time non-institutional and not coincident with classical libertarianism.

Usually, anything that has to do with libertarianism or anarchism is regarded as the most distant thing from democracy, but if my intention to construct a mixed position comes out realizable, this will respond implicitly to the question whether a kind of anarcho-libertarianism permissive towards democracy is conceivable. In my initial terms, the question may be put: The members of democratic societies are familiar with the following paradox of democracy: This subject has been and will be touched in every abstract debate on the democratic political system; likewise, critiques of democracy have pointed and will point it out.

There where opinidi single human being fails to engage oneself into the right course of action, a majority of people can fail too; consequently, a majority might in principle respect democratic procedures to elect, perhaps against its goodwill, leaders determined to uproot the very democratic procedures. Plato wrote in the Republic be a similar argument against democracy, and Karl Popper, defending democracy in The Open Society and Its Enemiesfamously criticized him.

I believe that this view of Platonism is superficial. All long-term politics are institutional.

My second point of interest consists in the way Popper characterizes his own institutionalist view. I put it threefold: Not only democracy, but all sovereign systems must confront the paradox emphasized by Plato. However, some institutions are better then others; for instance, typical democratic institutions permit the peaceful alternation of governments and room for their own gradual improvement. Surely Popper did not want it to appear so.

He would have wanted to accommodate personal leadership, while maintaining the central role of impersonal institutions. First, since institutions need personal guidance, the question is relevant to the recruitment of the institutional heads: In what sense, then, are political institutions impersonal?

Obviously, not in the sense they do not concern persons.

Cristalizarea opiniei publice – Edward Bernays – [PDF Document]

At times, we say about attitudes or relations among persons that they are impersonal, e. As any set of habits and relations among individuals; they comprise all the ingredients of human behavior: Facing crises, they are exposed to the lack of some of these ingredients — especially confidence — or to the affluence of others. Institutions are not impersonal per sethey become impersonal from the moment the members of a community embrace political practices which can be described as impersonal.

Furthermore, saying that an institution works properly amounts to publics that the members of a community observe such and such social practices. The latter is consistent with point 3. Fristalizarea is presupposed that not everyone would be competent and eager to work for the institutions.

I do not personally believe that Popper saw institutions as objects. Popper, unlike Rawls pp. When we conceive a point of view crisfalizarea which objective evaluations of social arrangements, in terms of preferences, can be made, we assume opuniei a group of individuals, the institutional experts, would be involved more than others in making and preserving the institutions.


Now, that opiniej should bear different responsibilities with respect to their political practices is an ethical issue in itself; and perhaps it is not objectionable, under the most rigorous ethical angle, to let someone bear the whole responsibility, provided one wishes it, as it is wrong to deprive someone of political participation. Besides, this makes from the outset democracy inapplicable in those places of the world where publoce is a critical lack of benevolent institutional workers, where the vast majority of the people are unwilling to support different political burdens.

Another inconvenient of institutionalism follows from point 2.

Point 2 states nonetheless that we could evaluate different institutions or sets of institutions as if we were able to appreciate in moral terms that one system is better or worse than another. But if systems are to a degree right or wrong, citizens become morally unaccountable to that degree. The problem is that nobody would simply free of moral responsibility the citizens of National Socialist Germany for what happened in the concentration camps during World War II — and neither would Germans themselves — because several German institutions functioned wrong or because the whole system went wrong.

We normally take the other way around: Thus, the institutionalist who would try to preserve both the responsibility of the citizens and the possibility of evaluating systems morally would assume an enormous task – to further evaluate individual responsibilities.

Unfortunately, we cannot measure the institutional effects of a system to correlate them thereafter with specific shares of responsibility. In addition, the benefits of a social and political system are relative to the preferences of the evaluator.

We do not have exact criteria for locating the best democracy among the existent group of democratic countries, much less for locating the best current political system.

Now the question arises whether the difficulties of the institutionalist view entail that every attempt to evaluate institutions is doomed to failure. The anarcho-libertarian claims a parallel modality of looking at the institutions. The anarcho-libertarian first concentrates on the human activity behind the neutral surface of the institutions; he sees the institutions as cultural practices.

Soon, the very individualistic methodology provides a tool for institutional appraisement, i. Human beings evaluate their everyday practices by means of the common morality. This should apply to state institutions as well, thinks the anarcho-libertarian, convinced that it is not worth searching for auxiliary meansbecause there are none.

Just as institutions pertain to nothing but human activity, evaluating the institutions has to be part of a common practice. To illustrate the previous lines, I quote two paragraphs from one of the most prominent contemporary anarcho-libertarians, Murray Rothbart:. All other persons and groups except for acknowledged and sporadic criminals such as thieves and bank robbers obtain their income voluntarily […] Only the state obtains its revenue by coercion, by threatening dire penalties should the income not be forthcoming.

Taxation is theft, purely and simply […] p.

Edward-Barneys-cristalizarea-Opiniei-Publice | Comerciantul de Carti –

Even if Rothbart probably expects his contention that taxation is theft to produce some rhetorical effect, he makeson the other hand, a moral oliniei in the every-day language. Rothbart clearly connects state violence with the transgression of the usual human practices. But describing how Rorthbart proceeds to set up his incriminations does not justify them. I guess that in spite of and beyond its pathos, the paragraph quoted from Rothbart contains something intuitive.

The democratic state does constrain people to pay taxes; it does impose several monopolies too. We generally think that there is a reason for such measures, that is, the will of the people substantiated into political action by the democratic institutions.

Cristalizarea opiniei publice – Edward Bernays

We are inclined to say, after Max Weber, that the state has a legitimate monopoly of violence. Could this mean that any institutional action is right? The paradox of democracy examined earlier obliges us pjblice respond to this question negatively.

It is possible for a freely elected dictator crisatlizarea manipulate state institutions towards violent ends. However, someone might object, since violent manipulation of democratic institutions have rarely occurred in history, we could make the necessary adjustment and say that the democratic state has, with few exceptionsa legitimate monopoly of violence. Rothbart goes anyway further than pointing out the possibility of such unfortunate events; he implies that violence characterizes as a matter of fact every collective action undertaken through the state institutions.


This is not counterintuitive either, and it is not strictly a libertarian idea. Kant similarly claimed in Perpetual Peace. Although this partial conclusion allows more than the weaker version of the paradox of democracy, it is only closer to the stronger one.

State violence is not defensive with respect to its citizens, but punitive. The democratic state will exert its power to discipline any of its non-violent citizens who would not submit to the collective decision.

That this is particularly true for those historical situations where the democratic majority adopted obviously wrong decisions should not prevent us from recognizing that somebody will always be wronged by the democratic decision.

One would probably think now that there must be some cases of legitimate use of non-defensive violence. We all learn in school something like the following moral dilemma: Is he guilty of theft?

The intention of his action being good, we tend to exonerate the man. I would say, nevertheless, that our attitude towards him has yet to be refined depending on how he acts after the stealing episode. We can imagine at least three outcomes of this story: What motivates the different shades in our attitude towards the man introduced with the three crkstalizarea outcomes? We need to hear justifications from the man who stole a drug to heal his wife.

Rights are so structured that defensive violence is self-justifying, whereas non-defensive violence is not. The pith of the anarcho-libertarian incrimination of the state is plain: The state is projected by construction outside the ordinary practices.

But anarcho-libertarianism has its own paradox. The negative emphasis on rights contrasts with the expected elimination of the enforcement agent. opiniiei

A political program whose aim is to attain the social order crlstalizarea maximally respected rights must include means for its actualization. As the eradication of institutional violence by political means calls for a precise identification of those responsible for the violations of rights, the individuals in power appear fundamentally different from anybody else.

The anarcho-libertarians are thus confronted with two major problems. For one, it looks as if it took a secondary state to have officials account for the violations of rights, since there are no available institutional means other than the democratic ones to fulfill such a complex judiciary task, let alone to ensure the passage to another political order – besides, it would be illusory to believe that no wrongdoer goes unpunished; rather, no crstalizarea is inescapable.

For another, the anarcho-libertarian picture celebrates a possible world of maximally respected rights – i. Political or institutional conflict, often manifestly violent, and certainly bloodier than ordinary crime, has never been absent from the history of mankind.

Even a perfectly imaginable privatization of justice and armed forces and the realization of a full-scale market system can be neither achieved, nor durably upheld by political means. Without a considerable growth of a culture of freedom and respect of rights, nothing will prevent the more powerful to shatter the maximal net of trust around him by dictating his own vision of right if he wants to. Unless we presuppose in our concept of libertarian anarchy that the personnel of the private associations delivering protection services is less corruptible than opiniri of any state military forces, we run the risk of turning the possible realm of the right into a Hobbesian state of war.

Also, conceiving the respect of rights as the mere by-product of unexamined traditions or habits will not do. Only a culture of reflective impersonal practices can resist commotion caused by external factors or opportunity for corruption. The paradox of anarcho-libertarianism originates in the rigidly negative application of the language of morality.

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