En un esfuerzo por darles la mejor experiencia posible al leer mis libros, ésta es la tercera edición de éste título de la serie Combate-Naval, en el que narro lo. afwiki Slag van Jutland; arwiki معركة يوتلاند; astwiki Batalla de Xutlandia; azbwiki cawiki Batalla naval de Jutlàndia; cswiki Bitva u Jutska; dawiki Søslaget ved. La Batalla de Jutlandia Situación naval Calibre de las escuadras navales. Fuerzas navales británicas buques • 28 acorazados.
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The Battle of Jutland German: The battle unfolded in extensive manoeuvring and three main engagements the battlecruiser action, the fleet action and the night actionfrom 31 May to 1 Juneoff the North Sea coast of Denmark’s Jutland Peninsula.
Jutland was the third fleet action between steel battleships, following the smaller but more decisive battles of the Yellow Sea and Tsushima during the Russo-Japanese War. Jutland was the last major battle in world history fought primarily by battleships.
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Germany’s High Seas Fleet intended to lure out, trap, and destroy a portion of the Grand Fleet, as the German naval force was insufficient to openly engage the entire British fleet. This formed part of a larger strategy to break the British blockade of Germany and to allow German naval vessels access to the Atlantic.
Meanwhile, Great Britain’s Royal Navy pursued a strategy of engaging and destroying the High Seas Fleet, thereby keeping German naval forces contained and away from Britain and her shipping lanes. The Germans planned to use Vice-Admiral Franz Hipper ‘s fast scouting group of five modern battlecruisers to lure Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty’s battlecruiser squadrons into the path of the main German fleet. They stationed submarines in advance across the likely routes of the British ships.
However, the British learned from signal intercepts that a major fleet operation was likely, so on 30 May Jellicoe sailed with the Grand Fleet to rendezvous with Beatty, passing over the locations of the German submarine picket lines while they were unprepared.
The German plan had been delayed, causing further problems for their submarines, which had reached the limit of their endurance at sea. On the afternoon of 31 May, Beatty encountered Hipper’s battlecruiser force long before the Germans had expected. In a running battle, Hipper successfully drew the British vanguard into the path of the High Seas Fleet.
By the time Beatty sighted the larger force and turned back towards the British main fleet, he had lost two battlecruisers from a force of six battlecruisers and four powerful battleships — though he had sped ahead of his battleships of 5th Battle Squadron earlier in the day, effectively losing them as an integral component for much of this opening action against the five ships commanded by Hipper. Beatty’s withdrawal at the sight of the High Seas Fleet, which the British had not known were in the open sea, would reverse the course of the battle by drawing the German fleet in pursuit towards the British Grand Fleet.
Fourteen British and eleven German ships sank, with a total of 9, casualties. After sunset, and throughout the night, Jellicoe manoeuvred to cut the Germans off from their base, hoping to continue the battle the next morning, but under the cover of darkness Scheer broke through the British light forces forming the rearguard of the Grand Fleet and returned to port.
Both sides claimed victory. The British lost more ships and twice as many sailors but succeeded in containing the German fleet. The British press criticised the Grand Fleet’s failure to force a decisive outcome, while Scheer’s plan of destroying a substantial portion of the British fleet also failed. The British strategy of denying Germany access to both the United Kingdom and the Atlantic did succeed, which was the British long-term goal.
At the end ofafter further unsuccessful attempts to reduce the Royal Navy’s numerical advantage, the German Navy accepted that its surface ships had been successfully contained, subsequently turning its efforts and resources to unrestricted submarine warfare and the destruction of Allied and neutral shipping, which — along with the Zimmermann Telegram — by April triggered the United States of America ‘s declaration of war on Germany.
Subsequent reviews commissioned by the Royal Navy generated strong disagreement between supporters of Jellicoe and Beatty concerning the two admirals’ performance in the battle. Debate over their performance and the significance of the battle continues to this day. With 16 dreadnought -type battleships, compared with the Royal Navy’s 28, the German High Seas Fleet stood little chance of winning a head-to-head clash.
The Germans therefore adopted a divide-and-conquer strategy. They would se raids into the North Sea and bombard the English coast, with the aim of luring out small British squadrons and pickets, which could then be destroyed abtalla superior forces or submarines.
In JanuaryAdmiral von Pohlcommander of the German fleet, fell ill. He was replaced by Scheer, who believed that the fleet had been used too defensively, had better ships and men than batlla British, and ought to take the war to them. After an equality of strength had been realised as a result of these operations, and all our forces had been made ready and concentrated, an attempt was to be made with our fleet to seek battle under circumstances unfavourable to the enemy. On 25 Aprila decision was made by the German admiralty to halt indiscriminate attacks by submarine on merchant shipping.
This followed protests from neutral countries, notably the United States, that their nationals had been the victims of attacks. Germany agreed that future attacks would only take place in accord with internationally agreed prize rules, which jutlandis an attacker to give a warning and allow the crews of vessels time to escape, and not to attack neutral vessels at all.
Scheer believed that it would not be possible to continue hutlandia on these terms, which took away the advantage of secret approach by submarines and left them vulnerable to even relatively small guns on the target ships.
Instead, he set about deploying the submarine fleet against military vessels. It was hoped that, following a successful German submarine attack, fast Jtulandia escorts, such as destroyerswould be tied down by anti-submarine operations. If the Germans could catch the British in the expected locations, good prospects were thought to exist of at least partially redressing the balance of forces between the fleets.
The hope was that Scheer would thus be able to ambush a section of the British fleet and destroy it. A plan was devised to station submarines offshore from British naval bases, and then stage some action that would draw out the British ships to the waiting submarines. At the start of May, difficulties with condensers were discovered jutlandiaa ships of the third battleship squadron, so the operation was put back to 23 May. U and U were stationed in the Pentland Firthwhich the Grand Fleet was likely to cross leaving Scapa Flowwhile the remainder proceeded to the Firth jtlandia Forthawaiting battlecruisers departing Rosyth.
Each bbatalla had an allocated area, within which it could move around as necessary to avoid detection, but was instructed to keep within it.
Battle of Jutland
During the initial North Sea patrol the boats were instructed to sail only north—south so that any enemy who chanced to encounter one would believe it was departing or returning from operations on the ee coast which required them to pass around the north of Britain.
Once at their final positions, the boats were under strict orders to jultandia premature detection that might give away the operation. It was arranged that a coded signal would be transmitted to alert the submarines exactly when the operation commenced: U was ordered to patrol the coast of Sunderlandwhich had been chosen for the diversionary attack, but because of engine problems it was unable to leave port and U was diverted to this task.
On 13 May, U was sent to lay mines in the Firth of Forth; on the 23rd, U departed to lay mines in the Moray Firth; and on the 24th, U was dispatched similarly west of the Orkney Islands. UB and UB were sent hatalla patrol the Humber, where incorrect reports had suggested the presence of British warships. UU and U were positioned north of Terschelling to protect against intervention by British light forces stationed at Jutlandiq.
On 22 Mayit was discovered that Seydlitz was still not watertight after repairs and would not now be ready until the 29th. The ambush submarines were now on station and experiencing difficulties of their own: The British had become aware of unusual submarine activity, and had begun counter patrols that forced the bztalla out of position.
UB passed Bell Rock on the night of 23 May on its way into the Firth of Forth as planned, but was halted by engine trouble. After repairs it continued to approach, following behind merchant vessels, and reached Largo Bay on 25 May. There the boat became entangled in nets that fouled one of the propellers, forcing it to abandon the operation and return home.
U laid its mines off the Orkney Islands, which, although they played no part in the battle, were responsible later for sinking the cruiser Hampshire carrying Lord Kitchener head of the army on a mission to Russia on 5 June. U was forced to abandon its mission without laying any mines when an oil leak meant it was leaving a visible surface trail astern. The Germans maintained a fleet of Zeppelins that they used for aerial reconnaissance and occasional bombing raids.
The planned raid on Sunderland intended to use Zeppelins to watch out for the British fleet approaching from the north, which might otherwise surprise the raiders.
By 28 May, strong north-easterly winds meant that it would not be possible to send out the Zeppelins, so the raid again had to be postponed.
The submarines could only stay on station until 1 June before their supplies would be exhausted and they had to return, so a decision had to be made quickly about the raid. It was batalka to use an alternative plan, ds the attack on Sunderland but instead sending a patrol of battlecruisers to the Skagerrakwhere it was likely they would encounter merchant ships carrying British cargo and British cruiser patrols.
It was felt this could be done without air support, because the action would now be much closer to Germany, relying instead on cruiser and torpedo boat patrols for reconnaissance. Orders for the alternative plan were issued on 28 May, although it was still hoped that last-minute improvements in the weather would allow the original plan to go ahead. The German fleet assembled in the Jade River and at Wilhelmshaven and was instructed to raise steam and be ready for action from midnight on 28 Jutlandiw.
The coded signal “31 May G. The pre-arranged signal to the waiting submarines was transmitted throughout the day from the E-Dienst radio station at Bruggeand the U-boat tender Arcona anchored at Emden. Only two of the waiting submarines, U and Ureceived the order.
German naval radio communications could therefore often be quickly deciphered, and the British Admiralty usually knew about German activities. The British Admiralty’s Room 40 maintained direction finding and interception of German naval signals. It had intercepted and decrypted a German signal jutlqndia 28 May that provided “ample evidence that the German fleet was stirring in the North Sea.
Batalla knowing the Germans’ objective, Jellicoe and his staff decided to position the fleet to head off any attempt by the Germans to enter the North Atlantic or the Baltic through the Skagerrak, by taking up a position off Norway where they could potentially cut off any German raid into the shipping lanes of the Atlantic or prevent the Germans from heading into the Baltic.
A position further west was unnecessary, as that area of the North Sea could be patrolled by air using blimps and scouting aircraft. Consequently, Admiral Jellicoe led the sixteen dreadnought battleships of the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons of the Grand Fleet and three battlecruisers of the 3rd Battlecruiser Squadron eastwards out of Scapa Flow at Hipper’s raiding force did not leave the Outer Jade Roads until The main German fleet of sixteen dreadnought battleships of 1st and 3rd Battle Squadrons left the Jade at The planned position would give him the widest range of responses to likely German moves.
The principle of concentration of force was fundamental to the fleet tactics of this time as in earlier periods. Tactical doctrine called for a fleet approaching battle to be in a compact formation of parallel columns, allowing relatively easy manoeuvring, and giving shortened sight lines within the formation, which simplified the passing of the signals necessary for command and control.
A fleet formed in several short columns could change its heading faster than one formed in a single long column. Since most command signals were made with flags or signal lamps between ships, the flagship was usually placed at the head of the centre column so that its signals might be ujtlandia easily seen by the many ships of the formation.
Wireless telegraphy was in use, though security radio direction findingencryption, and the limitation of the radio sets made their extensive use more problematic.
Command and control of such huge fleets remained difficult. Thus, it might take a very long time for a signal from the flagship to be relayed to the entire formation.
It was usually necessary for a signal to be confirmed by each ship before it could be relayed to other ships, and an order for a fleet movement would have to be received and acknowledged by every ship before it could be executed.
In a large single-column formation, a signal could take 10 minutes or more to be passed from one end of the line to the other, whereas in a formation of parallel columns, visibility across the diagonals was often better and always shorter than in a single batala column, and the diagonals gave signal “redundancy”, increasing the probability that a message would be quickly seen and correctly interpreted.
However, before battle was joined the heavy units of the fleet would, if possible, deploy into a single column. To form the battle line in the correct orientation relative to the enemy, the commanding admiral had to know the enemy fleet’s distance, bearing, heading, and speed.
It was the task of the scouting forces, consisting primarily of battlecruisers and cruisersto find the enemy and report this information in sufficient time, and, if possible, to deny the enemy’s scouting forces the opportunity of obtaining the equivalent information. Ideally, the battle line would cross the intended path of the enemy column so that the maximum number of guns could be brought to bear, while the enemy could fire only with the forward guns of the leading ships, a manoeuvre known as ” crossing the T “.
Within the existing technological limits, a trade-off had to be made between the weight and size of guns, the weight of armour protecting the ship, and the maximum speed. British ve sacrificed weight of armour for greater speed, while their German counterparts were armed with lighter guns and heavier armour. These weight savings allowed them to escape danger or catch other ships. Generally, the larger guns mounted on British ships allowed an engagement at greater range. In theory, a lightly armoured ship could stay out of range of a slower opponent while still scoring hits.
The fast pace of development in the pre-war years meant that every few years, a new generation of ships rendered its jutlanxia obsolete. Thus, fairly young ships juglandia still be obsolete compared to the newest ships, and fare badly in an engagement against them. Admiral John Fisherresponsible for reconstruction of the British fleet in the pre-war period, favoured large guns, oil fuel, and speed.
Admiral Tirpitzresponsible for the German fleet, favoured ship survivability and chose to sacrifice some gun size for improved armour.